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Implication of the No Child Left Behind Act for
Educational Equity and Segregation
L. Darnell Weeden*
INTRODUCTION
The issue to be addressed is whether the No Child Left Behind Act
(“NCLBA”) is a proper tool for advancing equity in education. Provisions
of the NCLBA that require states to adhere to educational accountability
1
have been construed as being seriously underfunded. These provisions
have been argued as underfunded in not providing the states with adequate
federal funding to compensate for the state’s compliance with the Act’s
2
provisions. The prerequisites of NCLBA have also been viewed as con3
flicting with established desegregation orders in public schools. However,
some parents of public school students see NCLBA as an effective method
4
of providing their children with better educational opportunities. There are
many good reasons for opposing the NCLBA accountability provisions and
developing the position that NCLBA accountability provisions are in viola5
tion of the Spending Clause. Laws that require public schools to expend
more economic resources than they can reasonably afford should be consid6
ered unconstitutional.
This paper will include a brief discussion in Part I of the historical development of federal aid for public elementary and secondary education.
Part II addresses the Spending Clause. Part III presents an evaluation of
State of Connecticut v. Spellings. Part IV gives an analysis of the NCLBA
*
Associate Dean and Roberson King Professor, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. I would like to thank my research assistant Tina Fields, Class of 2009, Thurgood
Marshall School of Law Texas Southern University for her help. I extend a special word of thanks to
my wife and children for their support.
1
See City of Pontiac v. Spellings, 2005 WL 3149545 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Connecticut v. Spellings,
453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006).
2
Spellings, 2005 WL 3149545 at *1.
3
Anita F. Hill, A History of Hollow Promises: How Choice Jurisprudence Fails to Achieve
Educational Equality , 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 148 (2007).
4
See Sam Dillon, Alabama Plan Brings Out Cry of Resegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007,
at A1.
5
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
6
Id.
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accountability requirements. Part V reviews the 2007 Congressional debate
about the NCLBA. Part VI explores the impact of the NCLBA on school
integration.
I. A HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Since the 1960s, the United States has funded public school education
7
through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”). The
ESEA authorizes the disbursement of federal aid to school districts and
8
school systems. In 1965, the Act came out of the efforts of President Johnson to combat poverty and Congress’ quest to provide “educational rights
9
that apply to all students.” Decades later in the 1980s, the government,
under President Reagan, published A Nation at Risk, which reported on the
weak reading skills of the nation’s students and insisted on the need to re10
verse mediocre education in the nation. The focus of education through11
out the country then began to shift to higher standards and achievement.
In 1994, President Clinton reauthorized the ESEA and set the stage for
12
the accountability provisions that the NCLBA would later adopt. In 1994,
Congress passed Goals 2000: Educate America Act (“Goals 2000”), which
provided federal funds to states for the development of state standards and
13
assessment systems. As a compliment to Goals 2000, President Clinton
14
authorized the Improving America's Schools Act (“IASA”). IASA “re15
quired that states assess all students at certain grade levels.” Together
these two laws were “aimed at providing states with the capacities and in16
centives to engage in standards-based reforms.” Due to problems with the
implementation of these laws, they were abandoned and never reautho-

7
Kimberly D. Bartman, Public Education in the 21st Century: How Do We Ensure That No
Child is Left Behind?, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 95, 110 n.133 (2002).
8
Id.
9
Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Court to Influence the Implementation of No Child Left
Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 785 (2006).
10 John Heintz, Political Currency and Hard Currency: The No Child Left Behind Act Turns
Three, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 345, 346 (2006) (citing THE NAT’L COMM.ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC.,
A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983)).
11 Superfine, supra note 9, at 786.
12 Erin Archerd, Spanish-Language Test Accommodations: Recommended or Required by NCLB?,
9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 163, 167 (2006).
13 Superfine, supra note 9, at 786.
14 Id.
15 Archerd, supra note 12, at 167.
16 Superfine, supra note 9, at 786.
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17

A few years later, President George W. Bush signed into law the
rized.
18
NCLBA, to achieve equal academic standards throughout the nation.
II. SPENDING CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . to provide for . . . the general Welfare of the
19
United States.” Commentator Gina Austin believes that the federal government’s regulation of the state’s authority to maintain educational programming violates the Spending Clause by requiring states to follow na20
tional guidelines in order to receive financial support for schools. The
Supreme Court identified four requirements in South Dakota v. Dole that
21
allow for federal funding without the Spending Clause. The funding must
22
be exercised to promote the general welfare of the United States. The
23
condition for funding cannot be ambiguous. The money should have a
24
relationship to a federal concern. Lastly, the conditional funding must not
25
conflict with another constitutional provision.
The four Spending Clause restrictions were designed to prohibit Congress from using federal funds to place an undue regulatory burden on the
26
states. Most of the cases involving accusations of Spending Clause violations have resulted in federal courts upholding Congress’ conditional spend27
ing legislation.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. SPELLINGS
A.

Arguments Against Compliance with Accountability Standards:
Emphasis on State of Connecticut v. Spellings
28

In State of Connecticut v. Spellings, the State challenged the U.S.
Secretary of the Department of Education’s (“DOE”) interpretation of sev-

17

Id. at 787.
L. Darnell Weeden, Essay, Does the No Child Left Behind Law (NCLBA) Burden the States as
an Unfunded Mandate Under Federal Law?, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 240 (2006) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301 (West 2002)).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1.
20 Weeden, supra note 18, at 242 (citing Gina Austin, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No
Child Left Behind Act Usurps States’Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 352 (2005)).
21 Id. at 243 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Austin, supra note 20, at 352.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 (D. Conn. 2006).
18
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eral key elements of the NCLBA. The State alleged that the Secretary’s
interpretation of the “Unfunded Mandates Provision” of the NCLBA is con29
trary to its plain language and Congress’ intent in enacting it.
In Count I of its complaint, the State sought a declaratory judgment
that would compel the Secretary to clarify the meaning of the Unfunded
30
Mandate Provision of the NCLBA. The State alleged that the Secretary’s
interpretation of the NCLBA violates the Spending Clause and the Tenth
31
Amendment in Count II of the complaint. Count III of the complaint challenged the Secretary’s denial of waivers and alleged failure to comply with
32
statutory requirements. In Count IV, the State alleged a violation of the
33
federal Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).
Under Count I, involving the declaratory judgment claim, the parties
challenged the Secretary’s interpretation of the following three provisions
of the NCLBA: (1) the requirement that special education assessments be
conducted at grade level rather than instructional level; (2) the requirement
that English-language-learning students receive mathematics assessments in
their first year in the country and reading assessments in the following year;
and (3) the requirement that non-formative annual testing occur in every
34
grade. Although the Court held that the State of Connecticut had standing
to bring the action, the Court determined it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the Secretary had not yet taken steps to
35
enforce her interpretation of the NCLBA.
1. Declaratory Judgment
The Secretary raised a number of objections to the State’s claims in
Count I (declaratory judgment claim). When deciding on a standing objection, the Court must presume the fact alleged, accept the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction, and construe all inferences in favor of the
36
plaintiff. The Court found that the State met the requirement of standing
because the State alleged that by denying the State’s waiver requests, the
Secretary was requiring the State to expend substantial sums in excess of
37
federal funding to comply with the NCLBA provisions. The Court reasoned that if the current funding is inadequate, a declaratory judgment pro-

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 501.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2002)).
Id. at 482, 489.
Id. at 481.
Id.
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hibiting the Secretary from requiring the State to expend more financial
resources to comply with the NCLBA provisions would remedy the State's
38
alleged injury.
Although the Court found that the State had standing, the Court acknowledged that allowing the State to challenge the Secretary’s interpretation of the NCLBA prior to any agency action against the State would undermine the comprehensive system for enforcement provided by Con39
gress. The General Education Provisions Act (“GEPA”) provides the Sec40
retary with a variety of mechanisms for enforcing the terms of NCLBA.
GEPA contains a comprehensive enforcement scheme that requires notice to
the agency’s Secretary and a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge,
41
which is subject to a discretionary review by the Secretary. After a final
agency action, the complaint may be appealed to the United States Court of
42
Appeals. The Court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter
until after concrete positions have been taken at the administrative level and
a full administrative record has been developed; thus, formal and final
43
agency action must have been taken prior to seeking judicial recourse.
When deciding on prudential ripeness, a court evaluates both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
44
withholding court considerations. The Court considered that fitness entailed statutory construction and was fit for judicial review, but desired a
45
further development of the record. The court found that because the State
was in compliance with the NCLBA, the State was not in danger of immi46
nent enforcement and thus not subject to any hardship. The Court stated
that it would rather have a final action by an administrative agency before
47
making a decision on the matter. The Court reasoned that the issue should
48
be taken up with the DOE. The Court reasoned that in order for it to decide the matter at hand, both parties were required to take the issue up at the
49
federal administrative level.

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 482.
Id. at 484.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 474; 20 U.S.C. §§1221-1240 (2002).
Spellings, 453 F. Supp.2d at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
See id. at 490.
Id. at 482, 484.
Id. at 489.
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2. Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment Claims
The State’s Spending Clause claim (Count II) focuses on the State’s
50
reasons for accepting federal funding under NCLBA. Under the Spending
Clause, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds provided to states, as long as the exercise of the spending power is in pursuit of
the general welfare and the conditions on funding are laid out unambigu51
ously. The State understood that the federal government would pay for all
52
of the costs that were associated with complying with the NCLBA. The
State claimed that the Secretary changed that condition as the State initially
53
understood it to be.
The State’s Tenth Amendment claim (also Count II) concerns the notion that the Secretary has the authority to withhold all Title I funding if the
54
State does not comply with the NCLBA’s testing requirements. This claim
focuses on the penalties that the State would face, if the Secretary should
55
find that the State was not in compliance with the NCLBA. The State
alleged that the penalties for noncompliance, which would include the
DOE’s withholding of Title I funds and other school-related funding, would
be harsh and unrelated to the State’s initial acceptance of the federal fund56
ing. Similar to the State’s declaratory judgment claim in Count I, the
Court found that Count II allegations of Spending Clause and Tenth
57
Amendment violations sought pre-enforcement declaratory rulings.
The
Court explained that such a decision on Count II would be directly tied to
58
the Secretary’s interpretation of the NCLBA. The Court determined that
in order to decide on the Spending Clause claim, the Court would have to
59
analyze the Secretary’s interpretation of the NCLBA. The Court cited the
State’s compliance as a reason why the Secretary has not yet withheld fund60
ing. The Court concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
61
to hear the Count II claim.
The State’s denial of waivers and abdication of statutory responsibility
claim (Count III) focuses on whether the Secretary’s denial of the waivers

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 491-94.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
Id.
Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493-94.
See id. at 493.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 494.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
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was arbitrary and capricious and whether the Secretary meaningfully con62
sidered the state waivers. The Court found that Congress did not grant the
Court any authority to consider a matter that is committed to the agency’s
63
discretion. Although the State alleged in its abdication of statutory responsibility claim that the Secretary flatly refused to consider waiver requests concerning a testing method, the Court found that there was proof of
the Secretary’s reasons for refusing the State’s requests, including the fact
64
that the State and Secretary had a number of discussions about the matter.
The State claimed in Count IV that the Secretary arbitrarily and capriciously denied the State’s request for plan amendments and violated the
APA in failing to provide an adequate hearing prior to rejecting the State’s
65
plan amendments. The Court found that a detailed analysis of the plan
amendments and an administrative record would better enable the Court to
66
make a decision on the denial of the State’s request for plan amendments.
The Court refused to dismiss the APA violation claim by the state because it
believed that a detailed administrative record would be helpful to the
67
Court. The Court believed that if the Secretary did violate the APA, the
appropriate solution would be to remand the hearing of the plan amendment
68
to the DOE. The State, however, stated in portions of its complaint and
69
brief that it wanted the court, and not the DOE, to rule on the matter.
Therefore, the Court found that the second part of the count, in which the
State alleged that the Secretary violated the APA in failing to provide an
adequate hearing prior to rejecting the State’s plan amendments, was
70
moot. The Court found the APA violation count moot because the State
did not seek to remand the issue for a hearing, but rather wanted the Court
71
to decide the merits of the plan amendments.
The State was able to continue with its claim that the Secretary’s denial of the State’s requests for NCLBA plan amendments was arbitrary and
72
capricious in nature and in violation of the APA. On appeal, the State motioned for entry of judgment on the dismissed Counts I (declaratory judgment) and II (Spending Clause and 10th Amendment), under Rule 54(b),

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 495.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
See id. at 501, 503.
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which provides that where the district court has dismissed some, but not all
claims in an action, certifying its judgment as final under Rule 54(b) is generally not appropriate if the same or closely related issues remain to be liti73
gated. The Appeals Court denied the Rule 54(b) motion and held that
because legal questions raised by Counts I (declaratory judgment) and II
(Spending Clause and 10th Amendment) were inextricably intertwined, they
74
were not appropriate for an entry of judgment under Rule 54(b).
The legal battles are shaping up. I believe that the litigation landscape
involving NCLBA is challenging. As indicated in Connecticut v. Spellings,
one can anticipate a battle over jurisdiction about who has the power to hear
disputes between the state and the DOE. These disputes clearly raise issues
of accountability requested by the federal government and the state’s reluctance to comply with federal requests because it believes that the federal
government has issued an unfunded mandate. The Connecticut v. Spellings
Court clearly indicated that it would rather not enter the NCLBA litigation
thicket without the benefit of prior agency proceedings. When it comes to
educational policies, I think it is fair to conclude that the battle for control
over education policy has only just begun. I anticipate, in the absence of
strong congressional intervention, that NCLBA litigation will be a persistent pattern for years to come.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NCLBA ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
A.

Arguments Against Compliance with Accountability Standards:
Emphasis on Commentary

Professor Danielle Holley-Walker has noted that there are two important issues that are involved in the debate of the burdens that NCLBA im75
poses on states. One is the federal government’s failure to provide suffi76
cient financial resources for the statutory requirements. Holley-Walker
cited School District of Pontiac v. Spellings, in which the state of Connecticut sued the DOE, alleging that the federal government’s requirement that
states use more money to pay for student testing than what the federal gov77
ernment provides is unlawful. Another burden is the notion that NCLBA
imposes regulation that has traditionally been the responsibility of the

73

Connecticut v. Spellings, No. 3:05CV1330(MRK), 2007 WL 329118, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 1,

2007).
74

Id. at *1-2.
See Danielle Holley-Walker, The Importance of Negotiated Rulemaking to the No Child Left
Behind Act, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1015, 1024-25 (2007).
76 Id. at 1024.
77 Id. at 1024-25.
75
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states. Holley-Walker stated that before NCLBA was enacted, every state
79
in the nation already had student testing systems in place. Professor Holley-Walker also provided information suggesting that some states have to
expend their resources to pay for both state and federally mandated ac80
countability standards.
Benjamin Michael Superfine has cited the failure to provide states, districts, and schools with the needed capacities, such as financial resources, to
comply with NCLBA mandates as one of the major problems plaguing the
81
implementation of NCLBA. States and state-level entities claim to have
only a limited ability to implement NCLBA testing and accountability pro82
visions effectively. The courts have not constituted an effective venue for
83
addressing these problems.
Superfine believes that the NCLBA Adequacy Approach would allow
courts to examine NCLBA implementation problems in terms of educa84
tional adequacy. The Adequacy Approach would allow courts to examine
the NCLBA’s implementation problems directly through the lens of educa85
tional adequacy. This will allow courts that use the approach to interpret
the NCLBA accountability mandates as necessary for a state to fulfill its
86
duties under the law. Courts would construe the effective implementation
of NCLBA mandates regarding standards and accountability as necessary
for a state to fulfill its constitutional burden under the relevant education
87
clause. The courts would use state standards to define education adequacy
88
in the state. However, Superfine believes that the NCLBA Adequacy Approach would be problematic for states because courts would only consider
the duty of a state under its constitution in solving the NCLBA’s funding
89
problems. The approach would not require the federal government to provide the states with additional funding to implement the NCLBA’s provisions, but instead would leave the states with less financial resources for
90
other areas of state funding such as health and housing.

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 1025.
Id.
See id. at 1026.
Superfine, supra note 9, at 781.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 840.
Id.
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B. Strain of NCLBA Meeting Accountability Requirements
A number of states have public schools that are failing to reach the
91
goals of achievement set by the NCLBA. The NCLBA is in its fifth year,
which has been prescribed as the year in which penalties for non92
achievement will be more severe. The severe penalties include firing
teachers and principals, shutting down schools, or a major change in the
93
leadership of the school.
However, many educational experts have stated that failing schools
94
have not actually been penalized as prescribed under the law. The schools
have been labeled as failing, but there has not been any action taken as a
95
result. A federal survey reveals that failing schools have been able to
96
avoid changes in leadership.
As a result of the lack of serious penalties
handed down, parents are upset about the lack of action being taken as re97
quired under the law.
One superintendent in Los Angeles stated that she would like to shut
down low-performing schools but it would be hard to do considering that
more than half of the schools in her district do not meet the NCLBA stan98
dards. The NCLBA also would not allow removal of some teachers under
the penalties provision because the NCLBA does not prevail over teacher
99
union contracts that were in place before the law was enacted. Under union contract provisions of the United Teachers of Los Angeles, teachers are
not allowed to examine their own student’s scores if it would result in the
100
teachers being evaluated based on the scores.
One teacher at a school
where teachers are not allowed to examine their own students’ scores be101
lieves that students suffer as a result of the teachers not being evaluated.
A parent at that same school believes that teachers should teach a curricu102
lum based on what the standardized tests will cover.

91 See Diana Jean Schemo, Failing Schools Strain to Meet U.S. Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2007, at A21.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Schemo, supra note 91.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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V. THE 2007 CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ABOUT THE NCLBA
The newest draft House Bill to renew the NCLBA has been criticized
103
by civil rights groups and teachers unions. When the House Education
Committee held its hearing in mid-September, the groups that voiced their
criticisms included the Center for American Progress and Achieve Inc., the
104
National Urban League, and the Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights.
These groups all oppose a proposal that would allow school districts to cre105
ate their own measure of student progress rather than use statewide tests.
The groups claim that the intent of NCLBA to teach children of all races
106
The new proposals in a House
and income levels would be defeated.
draft bill for NCLBA would no longer rely solely on math and reading test
107
The new proposals would
scores in determining the progress of a school.
allow schools to show their academic strength by including test results in
other subjects and other factors such as attendance, promotion, performance
108
in advanced placement courses, and graduation rates. There is also a proposed draft that would allow schools to test non-English speakers in their
109
native language for up to five years, rather than the current three.
The proposal in the draft that would allow schools to test non-English
speakers in their native language for up to five years, rather than the current
110
three, has been criticized by DOE Secretary Margaret Spellings.
Spellings contended that the law would weaken the NCLBA’s effort to raise
111
Spellings also comachievement level for poor and minority students.
plained that the proposals would defeat the NCLBA’s accountability ef112
Spellings particularly cited the testing of non-English speakers,
forts.
saying that the law would allow such immigrant students to get as high as
113
the 10th grade before they are ever tested in English.

103 Diana Jean Schemo, Teachers and Rights Groups Oppose Education Measure, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2007, at A25.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Diana Jean Schemo, Secretary of Education Criticizes Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at
A18.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.

112
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VI. IMPACT OF NCLBA ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION/SEGREGATION ISSUES
Holley-Walker also has suggested that some schools exclude minority
114
These schools restudents from the annual reports of student progress.
quest that they be exempt from NCLBA provisions that require a large
115
number of minority students to be included in assessment results.
This
action results in incentives to maintain a low percentage of minority stu116
dents in those schools. Holley-Walker disagreed with the argument that
NCLBA fosters integration efforts through the NCLBA’s provision that
allows student to transfer out of low-performing schools and into academi117
cally superior schools.
If the academically superior schools are predominantly white, then the
transfer option, when exercised by a minority, creates a more racially di118
verse student body at the predominantly white school.
When a highperforming student leaves the low-performing school, the low-performing
school suffers a loss both in intellectual achievement and intellectual diversity. When better performing students abandon low-performing schools, the
low-performing school’s risk of intellectual deficiency is expanded. A
proper role for public officials under NCLBA is to provide incentives for
low-performing schools to become competitive in the field of education
without encouraging bright students to abandon them. However, data shows
119
that few students are exercising the transfer option. Contrary to the integration suggestion, Holley-Walker asserted that NCLBA may in fact cause a
120
reversal of the desegregation efforts of the past 40 years. Professor Holley-Walker suggested that desegregation plans in some parts of the country
will be undermined by the mix that can occur by implementing the NCLBA
121
provisions. The DOE requires that some schools districts follow NCLBA
provisions in spite of possible conflicts with established desegregation
plans and also advised school districts to ignore established desegregation
122
plans.
One commentator, Anita Hill, has suggested that forcing the integration of poor and minority students into more economically advantaged
123
schools will increase the race and class problems that already exist.
Hill
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Holley-Walker, supra note 75, at 1028.
See id.
See id. at 1028-29.
See id. at 1029.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Hill, supra note 3, at 147
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also acknowledged that the provision of the NCLBA that allows students
who attend non-performing schools to transfer to other public schools
within the same school district will conflict with established desegregation
124
It is Professor Hill’s position that school districts in both the
orders.
South and the North will have their school desegregation efforts negatively
125
Furthermore, some black parents in
impacted because of the NCLBA.
the South have actually turned to the NCLBA to prevent schools from becoming once again segregated by race. After white parents in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, objected to overcrowded schools, school officials approved a
126
sweeping rezoning plan. Under the rezoning plan, a large majority of the
hundreds of students commanded to rearrange their school plans during the
fall of 2007 were black—and several were dispatched to virtually all-black,
127
low-performing schools.
Black parents have challenged the Tuscaloosa
rezoning plan because they believe school officials are implementing the
128
In a new change of legal direcplan in order to resegregate the schools.
tion for an integration fight, Black parents in Tuscaloosa have asserted that
129
the rezoning plan violates the spirit of the federal NCLBA. The NCLBA
provides students in failing schools the right to enroll in a better performing
130
Tuscaloosa is the city in which Governor George Wallace came
school.
to campus to prevent blacks from entering the University of Alabama as
131
students. As Sam Dillon observed: “Three decades of federal desegregation marked by busing and white flight ended in 2000. Though the city is
132
54 percent white, its school system is 75 percent black.”
Civil rights
lawyers maintain that Tuscaloosa’s rezoning battle is somewhat novel be133
School districts are concause the NCLBA has become a primary issue.
fronting “uncharted territory over whether a reassignment plan can trump
134
the law’s prohibition on moving students into low-performing schools.”
Even if the NCLBA may be used to help parents challenge a rezoning plan
influenced by race in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Professor Charles R. Lawrence,
III, an ardent critic of NCLBA, has argued that the NCLBA is an illconceived law implemented to ignore the root causes of racial segregation
124

Id. at 148.
See id.
126 Sam Dillon, Alabama School Rezoning Plan Brings Out Cry of Resegregation, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept.17, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 18155451.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Dillon, supra note 126.
133 Id. at A16.
134 Id.
125
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135

In his view, the NCLBA affirmatively hurts public
in public schools.
policy in education by redirecting public attention and resources away from
addressing the inequities of race and class while perpetuating, as well as
reinforcing, social and racist practices that keep on preventing poor, working-class black and brown children from have equal access to educational
136
opportunity.
The NCLBA maximum injury is inflicted by ignoring the race and
class history that created the conditions that have caused the educational
137
achievement gap that it pretends to close. As Lawrence observed: “The
[NCLBA] speaks often of race, requiring schools to keep separate data by
ethnicity and holding schools accountable for improving the test scores of
non-white students. But nowhere does it speak of ending racism or disman138
tling segregation.” Supporters of NCLBA condemn the disproportionate
harm that American schools impose upon poor black and brown children,
but these defenders of NCLBA do not acknowledge any societal or gov139
ernmental responsibility for that harm. In order to have moral credibility,
Professor Lawrence contends that advocates of NCLBA must acknowledge
the educational harm suffered by historically underrepresented groups in the
political process originated in America’s profound and entrenched separa140
tion involving white and black, rich and poor. Said Lawrence: “To listen
to the discourse on No Child Left Behind is to hear a story of failing
schools without a history—a history of segregation, of inadequate funding,
of white flight, of neglect, of eyes averted and uncaring while the savage
141
inequalities of American education grew ever wider.” The reworked justification for NCLBA erases history while relying on the modern myth of
142
formal racial equality.
Formal racial equality is narrative conveyed by
143
federal courts. In this narrative, school districts are confirmed as unitary
under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that black children go to
schools without any white classmate; that they are institutions of learning
where inequality does not exist, even though some children of color continue to attend schools with toilets that do not work and leaky roofs as other
students study on campuses furnished with state-of-the-art science labs and

135 Charles R. Lawrence III, Who is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of the New
School Reform, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 699, 706 (2006).
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 Id. (citations omitted).
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 Lawrence, supra note 135.
142 Id. (citations omitted).
143 Id.
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Olympic-sized swimming pools. In reality, racially and economically segregated suburbs exist as havens for white flight without any legal or constitutional liability for the segregation staying alive in either the suburban
schools or the inner city schools attended by their not-so-distant neigh144
bors. NCLBA made use of Marion Wright Edleman’s Children’s Defense
Fund call for Americans to come together and ‘Leave No Child Behind’ in
145
Professor Lawrence maintained that the Bush Adadopting its name.
ministration has used the NCLBA to lay claims as champions of poor black
children without honoring its duty to articulate the role that America has
146
played in the oppression of a black child’s right to educational equity.
In Tuscaloosa, Alabama, many black parents energetically reject a rezoning plan that required black students to transfer to low-performing
147
Said Kendra Williams, a hospital receptionist whose two chilschools.
dren were rezoned: “We’re talking about moving children from good
schools into low-performing ones, and that’s illegal. It’s all about race. It’s
148
as clear as daylight.”
Some key Tuscaloosa school officials defend the
149
rezoning plan as a proper response to claims of overcrowded schools.
Although school board members stated that the rezoning plan was not based
on race, black members of the town believed that the plan was another at150
tempt to return to separate-but-equal practice in education.
One issue for consideration under the NCLBA is whether a school rezoning plan can be defeated by construing the NCLBA as prohibiting
school officials from moving minority students into low-performing
151
When the rezoning matter was challenged in Alabama, the Alaschools.
bama state superintendent concluded that the rezoning plan did not violate
152
federal law.
The Alabama state superintendent concluded AfricanAmerican students could be transferred from a high-performing school to a
lower performing minority school without violating NCLBA as long as the
transferred African-American student had a right to retransfer back to the
153
Many black parents believed that it is an
better schools under NCLBA.
arbitrary use of power that defies the purpose of the NCLBA to allow
school officials to use school zoning laws to ship African-American stu-
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dents away from high-performing, racially integrated schools to lowperforming, racially identifiable schools. Black parents in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, as well as other southern communities in Florida, Tennessee, and
North Carolina, are attempting to use the NCLBA to assure that AfricanAmerican children are not routinely assigned into those schools that have a
154
reputation for being academically unsuccessful.
Professor Lawrence fears that the NCLBA and formal-equality rationale may cause African Americans and others to forget that the continuing
existence of racial inequality in education has not been realized in Tusca155
loosa, Alabama. The debate about NCLBA benefits and faults, and lack
of historical context did not cause supporters of educational equity in Tus156
caloosa to “forget the deep structures of inequality that remain in place.”
In fact, parents in Tuscaloosa hope to use the NCLBA to breathe new life
into Brown v. Board of Education, and to fight a segregation system designed to oppress children by teaching them that they are inferior because
157
of the color of their skin. Professor Lawrence concluded: “We are segregated still, by race and by class, and segregation still achieves its purposes
well. Can No Child Left Behind claim to be about equality without dismantling segregation, a system designed for inequality? I think not. But that is
158
exactly the claim it makes.” Daniel J. Losen, a Legal and Policy research
associate with The Civil Rights Project (CRP) at Harvard University, asserted that “[o]ne new step toward fulfilling Brown’s promise might be
found in the principle of race-conscious accountability embedded within the
159
The race-based accountability rationale advanced by the
[NCLBA].”
NCLBA may well provide an extraordinary array of novel tools for civil
160
rights advocates seeking equity in education.
Title I of NCLBA makes
available the biggest separate source of federal education funding directed
at assisting states in addressing the educational requirements that socio161
economically disadvantaged students must meet.
Every state must use
Title I funds to enhance its own educational spending and is barred from
162
Practically, each school
using federal money to replace its expenditures.
district in the United States collects some of the roughly $10 billion appro-
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priated annually. To accomplish its objective, Title I also includes a variety of monitoring and enforcement constraints that place conditions on
164
spending by the state, district, and school.
While approving NCLBA, Congress explicitly added race-conscious
accountability standards to Title I in an effort to equalize the terrible racial
165
disparities in educational success between whites and other racial groups.
The goal of the NCLBA contains the next statement, “[c]losing the
achievement gap between high and low-performing children, especially the
achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
166
disadvantaged and their more advantaged peers. . . .” NCLBA provides a
167
different accountability system which embraces technical assistance,
along with progressively more severe sanctions at the school and district
168
The main goal of NCLBA is to advance the academic skills and
level.
aptitude of all students by means of subgroup accountability to prohibit
school officials from ignoring racial disparities in achievement by not disclosing the subgroup achievement gap when the data is analyzed in the ag169
gregate.
Under the NCLBA, the constant failure of any focal, racial, or
ethnic group and of socioeconomically disadvantaged students at the school
or district level is capable of initiating an intervention that could lead to
170
sanctions.
Notwithstanding significant shortcomings with its execu171
tion, and what scores of educators maintain is an inappropriately test172
driven accountability plan, Title I’s changed accountability scheme on the
whole is one of the most race-conscious legislative remedies to address
racial inequity in K-12 education ever since Congress passed Title VI of the
173
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI).
Even if No Child Left Behind was not intended to affirmatively dismantle racial segregation, I think it offends the goal and purpose of the
NCLBA to allow public school officials to remove a black student from a
high-performing school with racial diversity and send that student to a lowperforming school that is virtually all black. Supporters of educational equity in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, may find it useful to follow Losen’s advice
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and engage in a campaign to raise awareness that the NCLBA has “several
race-conscious accountability provisions and requirements” that should
prevent school officials from transferring black students out of a highperforming integrated school to a low-performing school with a majority of
black students in order to increase the percentage of white students attend174
“Although the accountability
ing the high performing integrated school.
approach as represented by the NCLBA is far from ideal, the race-conscious
accountability requirements increase the chance that racial disparities will
be reported and discussed publicly. Despite the problems, the new principle
that all should take responsibility for tackling unacceptable and inadequate
achievement outcomes for every major racial and ethnic group is funda175
mentally sound and potentially transformative.”
Race-conscious accountability provisions are permissible only to achieve the race neutral objective of excellence in education for all students regardless of either race or
class.
VII. CONCLUSION
The NCLBA places a constitutionally impermissible regulatoryfunding burden on states and schools systems. Spending Clause regulation
of state school educational systems violates a state’s right to control its own
local educational policy as authorized by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. However, a state is not free to adopt local educational polices
that violate one’s right to be free of racial discrimination under the equalprotection-of-law concept. Those underfunded, highly regulatory provisions of the NCLBA should rightfully be regarded by the courts as the government’s exercise of power in violation of the Spending Clause. If Congress were ever to adequately fund the NCLBA, “the overarching question
is whether the race-conscious accountability approach in NCLB provides
176
any useful tools for advocates seeking racial justice.”
I believe that a
properly funded and properly implemented NCLBA may be used as a tool
to promote racial justice in education.
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